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Pass in Review: Due Process and
Judicial Scrutiny of Classification
Decisions of the Selective
Service System
By DONALD L. DOERNBERG*
The United States is moving quietly but steadily towards reinsti-
tuting the draft. Since the Selective Service System's induction author-
ity expired in 1973,' various military and civilian leaders have declared
the need to return to compulsory service.2 Registration of eligible
young men was resumed in July 1980,3 and two bills are pending in
Congress to restore the President's authority to order inductions. 4 De-
spite the fact that President Carter did not press for the immediate re-
sumption of the draft5 and President Reagan expressed disinclination
to reinstitute it,6 the nation is clearly moving towards its reinstatement.
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., 1966, Yale University; J.D.,
1969, Columbia University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editing assistance of Cynthia
Anne Pope.
1. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1976).
2. See, e.g., Bill Introducedin Senate to Reinstate the Draft, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981,
§ 2, at 7, col. 2; Halloran, Navy Chief, Reversing Stand, Supports Draft, Splitting with Carter,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1980, at 15, col. 1; Stennis Says It Is Time to Reimpose the Draft, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1979, at 56, col. 3; Army Is Disturbed By Recruit Quality, N.Y. Times, Jan.
11, 1977, at 9, col. I; No Rush to Fill the Ranks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
3. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). Registration had been sus-
pended in 1975 by President Ford. Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975).
Senator Hatfield refused to view the resumption as an empty gesture. "The mood of the
country had to be tested.... The first critical step toward resurrection of the full draft is
now complete." Hatfield, Draft Registration: Simple Prudence or a Dangerous Sign of
Desperation?, 17 WILLAMETrE L.L 1, 10 (1980).
4. S. 756, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2486 (daily ed. March 23, 1981);
H.R. 1210, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H175 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1981).
5. See Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, If the Draft Is Resumed" Issuesfor a New Selective Service Law, 36 REcoRD A.B.
Crry N.Y. 98, 99 (1981).
6. Raines, Reagan Vows U.S. WillPress Effort to Build Defenses, N.Y. Times, May 28,
1981, at 1, col. 6; Draft Officials Awaiting Decision From Reagan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980,
at 28, col. 5; Reagan, Anderson Disagree on Many Irsues But Treat Carter Lightly, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
Conscription has been a political and legal issue in the United
States since the 1700's.7 The constitutionality of conscription was set-
tled by the Supreme Court during the First World War.8 Since then,
the courts have attempted to strike a balance between the government's
interest in compelling military service and the citizen's interest in re-
sisting it.
This Article traces the development of judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions in the conscription process. After briefly reviewing the
history of conscription in the United States, the Article examines three
periods in which standards of review were developed. During the first
period, from the Civil War to the end of the Second World War, judi-
cial inquiry was restricted primarily to the question whether the regis-
trant's local board was acting in excess of its conferred jurisdiction.
This restriction was formulated by the lower federal courts; throughout
this period the Supreme Court did not address the issue of the scope of
review. During the second period, from the end of the Second World
War to the late 1960's, two new standards of review were promulgated:
a local board was held to lack jurisdiction either if its classification ac-
tion had "no basis in fact," 9 or if it was grounded on multiple bases and
at least one of these bases was legally insufficient. 10 During the third
period, beginning in 1969, the courts began to require that the Selective
Service System state reasons for its denial of a registrant's deferment
request.1 The result was a more searching examination of the deci-
sions of local boards and, correspondingly, a lowering of the conviction
rate of those charged with selective service offenses. 12 Although basis
7. See notes 18-20 & accompanying text infra.
8. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
9. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). Technically, the courts reviewed
the decisions of appeal boards, not of local boards. See Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S.
59 (1960); United States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Deere,
428 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1970). After 1971, appeals boards were required to give reasons for
Selective Service classifications in some cases. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 47 l(b)(4) (1976). Before
1971, they did not express reasons for their decisions. A local board occasionally did express
reasons, however, and the appeal board reviewed such a decision. See notes 78-112 & ac-
companying text infra. If the appeal board was silent, and it usually was, the courts consist-
ently held that they would consider that the appeal board had adopted all of the reasons
suggested by lower levels in the selective service process. See, e.g., Clay v. United States,
403 U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
French, 429 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1970); Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.
1954); United States v. O'Rourke, 341 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The cases, however,
uniformly speak in terms of review of local board decisions.
10. See notes 78-125 & accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text infra.
12. For example, in fiscal 1966, there were 516 prosecutions. Of these, 371, or 72%,
resulted in conviction. In fiscal 1968, of 1,192 prosecutions, 784, or 68%, resulted in convic-
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in fact remains the standard of review, it operates today differently
from the manner contemplated when it was announced in 1946.
The Article suggests a better basis for retaining the requirement
that the Selective Service System state reasons for its denial of a regis-
trant's deferment request than the two reasons most often stated: facili-
tation of administrative decisions13 and of judicial review.14 The
Selective Service System determines whether a person shall be required
involuntarily to serve two years in the military, possibly at the risk of
life and limb.15 Certainly those deprivations are as real and as severe
as any to which the due process clause is addressed.1 6 The Article con-
cludes that due process, not administrative or judicial convenience,
should be held to require that the Selective Service System justify its
decisions, which may affect registrants' lives and which do affect their
liberty.
The Development of Conscription in the United States
Federal conscription in the United States has had a brief history.17
During the Revolution, there was no draft; moreover, there was wide-
spread feeling before that war that a national standing army posed an
unacceptable threat to liberty. 8 George Washington suggested a draft
on at least three occasions during the Revolution,19 but the Continental
Congress never obliged him. Instead, the states were permitted to im-
pose a draft if necessary to fill their militias, which were then requisi-
tioned by the national government.20
tion. By 1970, prosecutions had risen to 2,833, but only 1,027, or 36%, resulted in conviction,
and in 1972, of 4,906 prosecutions, a mere 1,642, or 33%, resulted in conviction. [July-De-
cember 1972] SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF SE-
LECTIVE SERVICE 46.
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird, 453 F.2d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 1971).
14. See, eg., id.; United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir. 1970) (en
banc).
15. Moreover, service in the armed forces inevitably connotes loss or curtailment of
significant constitutional liberties. "While members of the military community enjoy many
of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian com-
munity, within the military community there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in
the larger civilian community." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974). Thus, the Court
held that servicemen do not enjoy, for example, the same range of first amendment freedoms
as do civilians. Id. at 758.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. Before the ratification of the Constitution, conscription by the states was common.
See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1918).
18. Friedman, Conscrotion and the Constitution, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1507 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman].
19. Id. at 1508.
20. Id.
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The first federal attempt to institute conscription occurred during
the War of 1812.21 The bill was not well received by Congress, 22 and
was never enacted. 23
During the Civil War, a statute was enacted that permitted the
national government to compel its citizens to render military service.24
The public's reaction was unambiguous; riots protesting conscription
occurred throughout the country.25 Reaction to the draft was not lim-
ited to individuals or unorganized groups; some state and local govern-
ments also resisted the conscription act.26 The Civil War draft,
however, was a short-lived experiment; it did not continue even to the
21. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1918).
22. The bill provoked sharp responses from members of Congress. For example,
speaking in the House of Representatives on December 9, 1814, Daniel Webster attacked the
notion of a compulsory draft: "The question is nothing less than whether the most essential
rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in the worst
form. . . . The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. The people of this country have not
established for themselves such a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast
expense of their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Charta to be slaves." 14 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 57 (1903).
23. Commentators have not agreed upon why the bill failed. Chief Justice White, writ-
ing for the Court in Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), briefly reviewed the history
of conscription in the United States and concluded that the Monroe Plan, named after then
Secretary of War James Monroe, was never adopted because "[p]eace came before the bill
was enacted." Id. at 385. Thus, the Chief Justice may have been implying that the bill
otherwise would have passed. See also R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY 126 (1967). Professor Friedman disagrees with this interpretation. "[T]he Court
blithely dismissed the most significant aspect of the Monroe Plan: not the fact that it was
introduced, but the fact that Congress never passed the proposal because a substantial
number of congressmen did not believe that the federal government had the power to con-
script." Friedman, supra note 18, at 1541.
24. Civil War Enrollment Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863); See R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 208 (1967). Professor Friedman notes, however, that there is
no agreement over whether the Act was a genuine conscription bill or merely a channeling
device to encourage the rich to pay the poor to serve for them. Friedman, supra note 18, at
1544. One commentator suggests that only 6% of the Union Army was procured through
conscription, rather than by commutation-payment of a sum of money in lieu of service-
or substitution-securing another person to serve the draftee's term. R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 210, 357 (1967).
25. Professor Friedman observed, "The largest disturbance, which took place in New
York City, resulted in an estimated 1,200 deaths and millions of dollars in property damage.
Fifteen regiments of regular troops were eventually required before the pillaging mobs could
be subdued." Friedman, supra note 18, at 1545.
26. See id. Resistance by states or municipalities is not just a phenomenon of the dis-
tant past. During the United States' involvement in Viet Nam, the Massachusetts legislature
enacted a bill requiring the state attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of the
war by an original action in the United States Supreme Court if possible. The Court refused
to accept the ensuing complaint, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), and Massa-
chusetts thereupon commenced an action in the district court. The First Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the action. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
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end of the war.27
After the end of the draft in April 1865, conscription was not again
a serious issue until the First World War. Shortly before the United
States declared war, a bill was introduced to establish the draft and,
despite opposition,2 was promptly enacted.29 At this time, the
Supreme Court undertook its only examination of the constitutionality
of conscription in Arper v. United States.30 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice White upheld the statute against a constitutional
attack based both upon article 131 and the thirteenth amendment. 32
The constitutional question has not again reached the Supreme
Court,33 although inferior federal courts occasionally have reviewed
the draft and echoed Arver.34
The draft did not reappear until September 1940.35 This draft was
the first in United States history to be established during peacetime;
although the war in Europe had begun, the United States was at peace.
27. Friedman, supra note 18, at 1546.
28. Id. at 1550.
29. Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (expired 1919).
30. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Years earlier, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld
the constitutionality of the Civil War draft. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863). For a
discussion of the constitutionality of the draft, see Friedman, supra note 18. The only devel-
opment in this area since 1969 has been the recent challenge to the all-male draft, which
does not challenge the concept of conscription itself. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(1981).
31. The Court focused upon the war power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, and the
"power to raise and support armies," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, as the sources of author-
ity which, together with the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18,
implied the propriety of conscription. The Chief Justice replied to arguments that this anal-
ysis read too much into the Constitution: "[I]t is said, the right to provide is not denied by
calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact
enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all
power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only
be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power."
245 U.S. at 377-78. Professor Friedman has attacked this technique of implying powers in
the national government. Friedman, supra note 18, at 1498.
32. The thirteenth amendment argument was disposed of in a single paragraph. "Fi-
nally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the
citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of
the rights and honor of the nation as the result of a war declared by the great representative
body of the people can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of
the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the
contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement." 245 U.S. at 390.
33. It was, however, mentioned by the Court as a settled issue in Billings v. Truesdell,
321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944), and in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 9 (1953).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 450 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1971); O'Connor v.
United States, 415 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding constitutionality of provision requir-
ing alternate civilian work), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 968 (1970).
35. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (expired 1945).
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Introduction of the bill evoked serious debate in Congress; 36 the bill
passed, however, and the Act continued to provide draftees until its
expiration on May 15, 1945.37
Only three years later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act
of 1948,38 which provided for conscription of every able-bodied male
sometime between his eighteenth and twenty-sixth birthdays. 39 Thus,
after 172 years, the nation seemed to embrace a permanent commit-
ment to a peacetime draft.40 This commitment was continued with the
passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act 41 and the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967,42 which were major revisions of
the 1948 Act.
Although by 1967 the nation was deeply involved in Viet Nam,
technically it was still at peace. Opposition to the de facto war and the
draft grew, however, as manifested by more frequent demonstrations
and litigation.43 Judicial recognition of the Selective Service System's
faults also became more frequent. 44 In part because of the judiciary's
increased sensitivity to problems created by the draft, Congress again
revised the operation of the Selective Service System in 1971. 45 The
draft continued, but with greatly improved protection for the regis-
trant's rights46 and concomitant restrictions on the Selective Service,
36. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1552.
37. Ch. 720, § 16(b), 54 Stat. 885, 897 (1940).
38. Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976)).
39. Ch. 625, § 4, 62 Stat. 604, 605-07 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 454
(1976)).
40. The only internal limitation in the 1948 Act was the date of expiration of the au-
thority for inductions. Ch. 625, § 17, 62 Stat. 604, 625 (1948). As that date approached,
however, Congress extended it, and continued to do so successively into the 1960's. Ch. 445,
§ 1, 64 Stat. 318 (1950); ch. 144, tit. I, § 1(w), 65 Stat. 75, 87 (1951); ch. 250, tit. I, § 102, 69
Stat. 223, 224 (1955); Pub. L. No. 86-4, § 1, 73 Stat. 13 (1959); Pub. L. No. 88-2, § 1, 77 Stat.
4 (1963). At the same time, registration and classification continued for every male between
the ages of 18 and 26.
41. Ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75 (1951) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976)).
42. Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (1967) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473
(1976)).
43. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); United States v. Berrigan,
283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), af'd, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909
(1969); [July-December 1972] SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 46.
44. See, e.g., Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
quoted in note 127 infra.
45. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, 85 Stat. 348 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 451-473 (1976)).
46. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 471a (1976). See notes 159-62 & accompanying text
infra.-
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whose operations had been largely unregulated.47
The impending withdrawal of United States forces from Viet Nam
led Congress to permit the draft to expire on June 30, 1973.48 Despite
occasional indications from the military that it wished to have induc-
tions resumed,49 not until 1980 was a serious effort begun to revive the
Selective Service System by reinstituting registration. 50 Thus, the draft
has existed for only thirty-three years, more than three-quarters of that
period in peacetime.
Judicial Review Before 1946
Review Before the Second World War
Prior to the Second World War, judicial challenges to the draft
were rare. Judicial review was available during the Civil War only by
writ of habeas corpus, which was limited to cases in which the conscrip-
tion authority had been illegally exercised. 51 Challenges focused on
local board actions that were entirely without authority because they
exceeded conferred jurisdiction.52
During the First World War, judicial review continued to be avail-
able only by writ of habeas corpus.53 Although the procedural mecha-
nism remained the same, the scope of review had been expanded. In
Angelus v. Sullivan,54 the court noted that draft board decisions could
47. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text infra.
48. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1976).
49. See note 1 supra.
50. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). The reinstitution of registra-
tion met some resistance. See, e.g., Draft Foes Protest Registration, N.Y. Times, July 29,
1980, § 11, at 7, col 2; Capital Protest is Planned Over Registration for Draft, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1980, at 16, col. 6; Kaiser, Campus Rallies Across U.S. Protest Registration Plan,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1980, at 16, col. 3.
51. See, e.g., Stingle's Case, 23 F. Cas. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 13,458); In re Irons, 13
F. Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 7066).
52. SeeIn re Irons, 13 F. Cas. 98, 99 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863).
53. One of the reasons for this limited review involved the structure of the draft.
Under the Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 2, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (expired 1919), issuance of
the induction order immediately conferred jurisdiction over the registrant upon the military,
subjecting the registrant to military law. See Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865, 868 (8th Cir.
1918); United States ex rel. Helmecke v. Rice, 281 F. 326, 329 (S.D. Tex. 1922); see also
Estep v. United States, 237 U.S. 114, 124 n.17 (1946); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 546
(1944). Violations of orders were then prosecuted by court-martial, not by criminal trial in
the civilian courts. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 132 n.1 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
54. 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917). InAngelus, a professed subject of Austro-Hungary, served
with a conscription order, claimed that he was exempt because of his status as an alien. The
local and appeal boards in New York City denied his application for exemption, whereupon
he filed for injunctive relief in the district court. The district court dismissed his challenge
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be reversed if "their proceedings have been without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, or have been so manifestly unfair as to prevent a fair in-
vestigation, or . . . there has been a manifest abuse of the discretion
with which they are invested under the act. . . ."55 Thus, the writ was
expanded to include matters, such as unfairness and abuse of discre-
tion, which ordinarily might not enter into.the question of jurisdic-
tion.5 6 Angelus thereby recognized three factors, any one of which
could invalidate an induction order: absence of jurisdiction, unfairness
of proceedings, and abuse of discretion.
Later courts more boldly reviewed substantive decisions of the
draft boards. In Arbitman v. Woodside,57 the court echoed the three-
part inquiry of Angelus and elaborated the abuse of discretion stan-
dard: "[U]pon proof that the investigation has not been fair, or that the
for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found that federal courts did have jurisdiction to
review conscription orders that allegedly exceeded the Selective Service System's jurisdic-
tion, id. at 63-64, but affirmed on other grounds.
55. Id. at 67.
56. See Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1918);Exparte Cohen, 254 F. 711 (E.D.
Va. 1918); United States ex rel. Pascher v. Kinkead, 248 F. 141 (D.N.J. 1918); Exparte Beck,
245 F. 967 (D. Mont. 1917); United States ex rel. Troiani v. Heyburn, 245 F. 360 (E.D. Pa.
1917).
This expansion of the reach of habeas corpus in the context of Selective Service cases
parallels its expansion in federal review of state criminal convictions. Prior to 1915, habeas
corpus was available only for a limited inquiry into the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
See Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Exparte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Exparte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). "The concept of jurisdiction, however, was subject to
considerable strain during this period .. " Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 450 (1963) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). The strain placed on the concept of jurisdiction during this period was made
manifest by cases that stretched the ordinary concepts of jurisdiction to reach claims that
otherwise might not have been cognizable. See, e.g., Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)
(writ held to lie to challenge conviction under unconstitutional statute).
In 1915, in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), the Court abandoned some of the
rigidity of the concept of jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the prisoner's opportunity
to have constitutional claims heard in the state court system. The final expansion of federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953),
unambiguously expanded the writ to reach all errors of constitutional law made in trial or
appellate proceedings. This change, too, is echoed in Selective Service cases that expanded
judicial review to reach all errors of law made by the Selective Service System. See notes
113-22 & accompanying text infra.
For more extended discussion of the development of federal habeas corpus, see Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism,
7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Hart, Foreword- The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 101-25 (1959).
57. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919). The facts of Arbitman were similar to those of Angelus.
Arbitman claimed an exemption from conscription because of his resident alien status. The
district court dismissed his challenge for lack of jurisdiction, but the appellate court re-
versed, holding that the federal courts did have jurisdiction to grant relief.
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board has abused its discretion by a finding contrary to all the substan-
tial evidence, relief should be given by the courts . *..."58 The
Arbitman court thus equated abuse of discretion with a board finding
contrary to substantial evidence. Angelus and Arbiman in effect
opened a debate concerning the extent to which the courts could review
the substantive decisions of the Selective Service System.5 9
Review from 1940 to 1946
During the early 1940's, as in the pre-1919 period, the courts con-
sidered whether the local board had jurisdiction, whether it had af-
forded the registrant a fair investigation, and whether it had abused its
discretion.60 In 1943, however, the Fourth Circuit asserted in Goff v.
United States6O that an "action [of the board] is to be taken as final,
notwithstanding errors of fact or law, so long as the board's jurisdiction
is not transcended and its action is not so arbitrary and unreasonable as
to amount to a denial of a constitutional right."'62 Goff appeared to
retreat from the Angelus and Arbitman elements of review, because it
implied that mere unfairness in the proceedings would not invalidate
an induction order. The Goff court did not explain its pronouncement,
58. Id. at 442.
59. Arbiman also foreshadowed another problem of judicial review that became acute
four decades later. The petitioner had demanded classification as a resident alien who had
not commenced the naturalization process. He submitted appropriate documentation to his
local board. The board simply elected not to believe Arbitman's evidence, although it had
none of its own. This unsupported disbelief was found sufficiently egregious to justify judi-
cial intervention on the petitioner's behalf. 258 F. at 443.
As conscientious objector applications proliferated in the later years of the draft, the
courts were faced with an increasing number denied by the Selective Service System solely
on the basis of local boards' unsupported disbelief of registrants' submissions. Like the
Arbitman court, later courts declined to endorse such decisions. See, e.g., Dickinson v.
United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884
(1960); cf Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971) (judicial review of conscientious
objector claims made by active-duty military personnel).
None of the draft acts prior to 1967 set forth the availability of judicial review, except
for the repeated statement that the decisions of the local boards were final except for review
in the selective service appellate process. See Selective Draft Law of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40
Stat. 76, 79-80; Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885,
893; Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 10(b)(3), 62 Stat. 604, 620. It was left to the
courts to determine what "final" meant. Arbitman, an early step in this determination, made
it clear that finality would not preclude all substantive challenges to the Selective Service
System's actions.
60. See, e.g., Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum); Rase v.
United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); United States exrel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 F. Supp.
872 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
61. 135 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1943).
62. Id. at 612.
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however, and it was not followed by other courts. The proper scope of
review thus was unclear, especially because the Supreme Court never
ruled on the propriety and scope of judicial review of selective service
decisions under the 1940 Act.63
While the courts considered the scope of review, they also wrestled
with the procedural problem of when to review draft board decisions.
During the early 1940's, the courts indicated their reluctance to inter-
fere with the Selective Service System's operation. Although issuance
of an induction order no longer automatically conferred jurisdiction
over the registrant in the military courtS,64 thus allowing draft resisters
to be prosecuted in the civilian courts, the courts continued to insist
that a registrant could obtain review of a classification decision only by
writ of habeas corpus after induction and not by refusing induction and
being indicted. 65 Thus, if the defendant refused induction, the court
would review only the board's jurisdiction, and not the broader ques-
tion whether the local board's actions had been arbitrary or without
substantial evidence. 66 In contrast, in habeas corpus cases the courts
could and did reverse a board decision if it lacked substantial
63. See United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 795 (1945).
64. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1944).
65. See Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. Rinko,
147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3d
Cir. 1944). In part, this doctrine may have derived from a practice developed under the
Selective Draft Act of 1917. Under that Act, there could be no criminal prosecutions in the
civilian courts for refusal to accept induction, because as soon as an induction order was
issued, the registrant was under military jurisdiction. See note 53 supra. In the 1940's, it
may have been thought that the registrant challenging his induction should be subject to
military jurisdiction while the challenge ran its course so that the military effort would not
be compromised.
As a practical matter, the procedural differences between challenging an induction or-
der by habeas corpus and by criminal defense are of enormous consequence to the regis-
trant. If he refuses induction and is indicted, he remains a civilian, prosecuted in the civil
courts. If he accepts induction and thereafter challenges the order that compelled it, he is
within the jurisdiction of the military and subject to its orders. Thus, any inductee who
subsequently challenges his induction order and fails to conform his conduct to military
standards while his challenge is being adjudicated may be subject to court-martial. See
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Billings v.
Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944); Comment, The Selective Service System." An Administra-
tive Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123, 2137 (1966).
66. For example, the court in Fletcher v. United States, 129 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1942),
never considered the defendant's claim for exemption on the grounds that he was a Jeho-
vah's Witness minister. He had pursued his claim through all available administrative chan-
nels and then had refused to submit to induction. At trial, the defendant offered to prove
that he had not been given a fair hearing by his local board, but the evidence was ruled
inadmissible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ensuing conviction. "The trial court was re-
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The trend towards restricting judicial review in time as well as in
scope reached its climax in Falbo v. United States.6" In a prosecution
for failure to report for alternative service, 69 the defendant argued that
the local board's rejection of his claim for exemption as a minister was
arbitrary, biased, and against the weight of the evidence. Although
Falbo's claim would have been cognizable under the prevailing stan-
dards of review for habeas corpus applications,70 the Court ruled, in
effect, that the case was not ripe for judicial intervention. "The narrow
question. . . presented by this case is whether Congress has authorized
judicial review of the propriety of a board's classification in a criminal
prosecution for wilful violation of an order directing a registrant to re-
port for the last step in the selective process. We think it has not."' 71 In
further discussion, the Court made it clear that the defense was rejected
because the defendant had not exhausted Selective Service System ad-
ministrative steps remaining after issuance of the induction order.72
quired to determine only whether the defendant, as a registrant, had been commanded by a
lawful authority to report for induction, and had knowingly failed to do so." Id. at 263.
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit was even more emphatic about the unavailability of
judicial review prior to actual induction. In Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1944),
the court explicitly ruled that the propriety of a registrant's classification could never be
reviewed in the context of a defense to an indictment. Id. at 759.
67. See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.
68. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
69. Registrants who claimed and were granted classification as conscientious objectors
were required to perform two years of civilian service in lieu of induction. Selective Train-
ing and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (expired 1945). Thus, for
purposes of judicial review, an order to report for alternative civilian service was analogous
to an order to report for induction. Falbo had filed as a conscientious objector and as a
Jehovah's Witness minister. The former claim had been granted; the latter denied. 320 U.S.
at 550-51.
70. See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.
71. 320 U.S. at 554.
72. These included a final physical examination or inspection by the military, which, if
the registrant failed, rendered him unacceptable for military service and ineligible for induc-
tion, thus obviating the need for any judicial review of classification decisions. Id. at 553.
The Court also noted practical reasons for not interfering with the draft. The majority
was concerned that excessive judicial intrusion might undercut the effort to obtain inductees,
pointing out that, in Falbo's case, litigation had kept him in court until he had almost be-
come ineligible because of his age. Id. at 555. The Court interpreted Congress' failure ex-
plicitly to authorize classification review in criminal proceedings as an expression of intent
that there be none. .d. at 554-55.
Dissenting, Justice Murphy stated that the majority's opinion proved too much, pre-
cluding review by habeas corpus, which the Court's majority presumably intended to retain.
Id. at 557. Justice Murphy also urged abandonment of the final order rule: "Criminal
punishment for disobedience of an arbitrary and invalid order is objectionable regardless of
whether the order be interlocutory or final." Id. at 558.
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Thus, under Falbo, a registrant who sought to challenge his induction
order by disobeying it, believing that in so doing he obtained judicial
review of an unfavorable classification decision, merely ensured his
conviction. A classification decision would not be reviewed unless the
registrant reported for induction.
Falbo was the first Supreme Court decision directly addressing the
availability of judicial review. The Court's disinclination to interfere
with selective service processing73 was immediately reflected in lower
court refusals to allow prosecuted registrants to defend on the basis of
improper classification. 74 At the end of the Second World War, there-
fore, registrants dissatisfied with their classifications faced a substantial
obstacle to bringing their dissatisfaction to the courts' attention.75 Judi-
cial review could be obtained only through habeas corpus, not in de-
fense to a criminal prosecution. A substantive hearing, once obtained,
was narrowly limited in scope by decisions of the courts of appeals.76
The result was a severe limitation on a registrant's ability to insist that
the Selective Service System function in an impartial and reasonable
73. Id. at 551-52, 554-55.
74. See, e.g., Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v.
Rinko, 147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d
169 (3d Cir. 1944). See generally Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 138-39 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Fujii v. United States, 148 F.2d 298
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Connor & Clarke, Judicial Investigation of Se-
lective Service Action, 19 TUL. L. REv. 344 (1945).
75. Since the beginning of the peacetime draft in 1948, both the deferment structure
and the administrative procedural structure have remained essentially the same. Defer-
ments have been made available to those whom the military considered mentally, physi-
cally, or morally unfit (1-Y and 4-F), students (1-S(C) and 2-S), those engaged in
occupations essential to national welfare (2-A), those engaged in agriculture (2-C), and those
whose induction would work an extreme hardship upon their dependents (3-A); exemptions
or alternate forms of service were available to ministers (4-D) and conscientious objectors
(I-A-O and 1-0). See 32 C.F.R. pt. 1622 (1970). Most of these classifications involved the
draft board in discretionary determinations of the registrant's entitlement to the classifica-
tion, such as whether the registrant had demonstrated extreme hardship (3-A), whether he
was sincere in his professed beliefs (1-A-O and 1-0), or whether he was, in fact, engaged in
an essential occupation (2-A). Regulations promulgated since the 1971 amendments have
streamlined the classification structure to some extent by eliminating the 2-A, 2-C, and 1-
S(C) deferments. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 1622 (1981). Granting or denying a deferment in part
upon the draft board's subjective evaluation of the registrant's entitlement raised obvious
possibilities of challenge, both in the administrative process and in the courts. For an excel-
lent description of the Selective Service System administrative process, see Comment, The
Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123 (1966).
76. See, e.g., Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum); Rase v.
United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 F. 441 (4th Cir.
1919); Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917); United States ex rel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39
F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
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manner.77 Both this problem and the absence of a generally accepted
standard of the scope of review were not addressed by the Supreme
Court until after the draft ended.
Post-War Review Under Estep v. United States
The Basis-in-Fact Test
In 1946, the Court in Estep v. United States78 first addressed the
question of the scope of judicial review available to a Selective Service
registrant challenging a classification action. The Falbo Court had
clearly stated that the opportunity to challenge a local board decision
would remain narrowly circumscribed, but had denied review on pro-
cedural grounds; thus, it did not address the permissible scope of judi-
cial review of classifications.
In Estep, the Court explicitly attributed the result in Falbo to the
defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available to him
with respect to his induction order.79 Thus, by implication, the Court
repudiated cases from the lower courts that had interpreted Falbo as
precluding any judicial review in a criminal proceeding. 0 The Estep
Court stated: "Falbo. . .does not preclude such a defense in the pres-
77. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
78. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
79. "In Falbo v. United States ... [w]e found no provision for judicial review of a
registrant's classification prior to the time when he had taken all the steps in the selective
process and had been finally accepted by the armed services. The question in these cases is
whether there may be judicial review of his classification in a prosecution under § 11 where
he reported for induction, was finally accepted, but refused to submit to induction." Id. at
115-16 (1946). This statement of the issue should be contrasted with the statement in Falbo.
See text accompanying note 71 supra. As the Estep Court portrayed Falbo as an exhaustion
of administrative remedies case, its task in interpreting the finality language of § 10(a)(2) of
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885, 893 (expired
1945), to permit review in some criminal proceedings was considerably easier. See note 53
supra.
Years later, the courts faced the question whether they could review Selective Service
actions before issuance of an induction order. In general, they cannot. See Clark v.
Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968). In a few unusual instances, however, pre-induction judicial
review is permitted. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S.
233 (1968) (pre-induction judicial review allowed when entitlement to statutory deferment
as a minister was plain, unequivocal, and uncontested, and registrant was punitively reclas-
sified 1-A for reasons unrelated to his qualifications for deferment); Wolff v. Selective Serv.
Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) (pre-induction review allowed when students
were reclassified as available for military service only because they participated in antiwar
demonstrations). See generally Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 7, 405 U.S. 365
(1972); Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 438 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1971).
80. See, eg., Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v.
Rinko, 147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d
169 (3d Cir. 1944).
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ent cases. In the Falbo case the defendant challenged the order of his
local board before he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Here
these registrants had pursued their administrative remedies to the end.
All had been done which could be done."' 8' In Falbo, review was de-
nied because the registrant failed to report for service and was not
physically examined. 82 In Estep, the registrants had reported, had
completed all steps of the administrative process, and had remaining
only the symbolic step forward; the Court ruled that the administrative
process had come to an end, and judicial review would be allowed.
Having decided that Falbo did not preclude review, the Court ad-
dressed section 10(a)(2) of the Selective Training and Service Act,
which provided that in general "[t]he decisions of such local boards
shall be final."' 83 This section had been thought to preclude classifica-
tion review by the courts in the criminal defense context,84 but the
Supreme Court, building on the theory of review from earlier, non-
selective service habeas corpus cases, 85 seemed simultaneously to limit
the statutory language and to allow an extensive classification review
by the courts.
[A local board's] authority to hear and determine all questions of
deferment or exemption is, as stated in § 10(a)(2), limited to action
"within their respective jurisdictions." It is only orders "within their
respective jurisdictions" that are made final .... By § 10(a)(2) the
81. 327 U.S. at 123.
82. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
83. Ch. 720, § 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885, 893 (expired 1945).
84. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 138-41 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). Justice Frankfurter's argument may prove too much. It is difficult to interpret the
language of§ 10(a)(2) to exclude all judicial review in the criminal context and yet to permit
it by way of habeas corpus. This is the problem Justice Murphy had pointed out in his
dissent in Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). See note 72 supra. Yet to interpret
the language so broadly would raise the specter of a conflict between § 10(a)(2) and the
habeas corpus clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. Apparently to avoid
this conclusion, Justice Frankfurter cited a report of the House Committee on Military Af-
fairs from January, 1945, that interpreted the Act to prohibit judicial review of classifications
in the criminal forum while permitting it under habeas corpus. Estep v. United States, 327
U.S. 114, 140 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Estep majority was aware of this possible problem as well, but declined to treat it
as a constitutional conflict, implicitly construing the Act to permit habeas corpus review.
The anomaly of refusing judicial review in the criminal proceeding struck the Court. "It has
been assumed that habeas corpus is available only after a registrant has been inducted into
the armed services. But if we now hold that a registrant could not defend at his trial on the
ground that the local board had no jurisdiction in the premises, it would seem that the way
would then be open to him to challenge the jurisdiction of the local board after conviction
by habeas corpus. The court would then be sending men to jail today when it was apparent
that they would have to be released tomorrow." Id. at 123-25 (footnotes omitted).
85. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
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local boards, in hearing and determining claims for deferment or ex-
emption must act "under rules and regulations prescribed by the
President." Those rules limit, as well as define, their jurisdic-
tion. . . . [Action by a local board outside of those regulations]
would be lawless and beyond its jurisdiction.8 6
The Court's analysis approved the limitation of review of selective
service actions to questions of local board jurisdiction, apparently cir-
cumscribing the ambit of judicial review.87 The Court defined the con-
cept of jurisdiction broadly, however, giving courts the flexibility to
review local draft board decisions. After Estep, any direct violation of
selective service regulations would be subject to judicial review and, as
Est.p made clear, that review could be by habeas corpus after induc-
tion or by criminal defense after refusal of induction.
The Court next had to determine when, if ever, a discretionary
decision was so unsupported that it warranted judicial intervention,
and it held: "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached
only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the
registrant."8 8 By setting forth this standard, the Court underscored the
narrowness of the intended review.89 At the same time, it authorized a
limited substantive review of classification decisions. Thus, a scope of
review similar to that developed during the First World War inAngelus
v. Sullivan90 and Arbitman v. Woodside9' was retained, although as a
formal matter judicial inquiry was limited to the jurisdiction question.
Therefore, three drafts and eighty-three years after conscription
first appeared in the United States, the Supreme Court finally decided
the circumstances under which the courts would be permitted to adju-
86. 327 U.S. at 120-21.
87. See notes 51-63 & accompanying text supra.
88. 327 U.S. at 122-23.
89. The Court noted that this standard of review is the same as that used in deportation
cases. Id. at 123 n.14. The Court reviewed Congress' declaration that local board decisions
were final. "The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that
Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope ofjudi-
cial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the
evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The
decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though
they may be erroneous." Id. at 122.
The basis-in-fact issue is a question of law, not of fact. United States v. Purvis, 403
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Miller v. United States, 169 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1948). The trial
judge in a jury case, therefore, would charge the jury that a basis in fact exists or does not
exist as a matter of law, leaving for the jury only the factual question whether the registrant
failed to obey the order he was charged with violating. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 456
F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1971).
90. 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917).
91. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919). See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.
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dicate the government's claim upon an American's military service.
The basis-in-fact test developed in Estep remains the standard applied
in selective service cases 92 and in cases involving military refusals to
grant a discharge. 93 The basis-in-fact test, however, has proved diffi-
cult to apply.94 Basis in fact clearly was a limited standard of review;95
it was criticized on the grounds that it would permit criminal convic-
tions without substantial evidence to support them.96 The basis-in-fact
test's application in trials of selective service indictments however, re-
mained unclear.
The Court reached this issue in Dickinson v. United States.97 Dick-
inson had claimed exemption from service as a minister, but his claim
was denied. He refused induction, and was convicted for his refusal.
The Court declared that the reviewing court was required to search the
registrant's record for some affirmative evidence to support the local
board's denial of the exemption. 98 At the same time, the Court explic-
itly rejected any broader standard of review, such as a "substantial evi-
dence" test.99 In Dickinson's case, however, there was no evidence in
the file countering his claim for deferment; apparently the local board
simply had not believed him, and the lower courts had endorsed its
decision. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction. "[W]hen the
92. The Estep standard was incorporated into the selective service statute in 1967. Mil-
itary Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(8), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3) (1976)).
93. The standard of judicial review of military decisions denying discharge of members
of the armed forces has been taken from Estep. Cases arising under the selective service law
and other military laws often are used interchangeably as precedents. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
94. See, e.g., Barker v. Laird, No. 1276-70, slip op. at 12 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 1971).
95. One court later characterized it as "the narrowest known to law." Blalock v.
United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957); accord United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d
472, 483 (5th Cir. 1971); Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 915 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated on
other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
The Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), was adopted in the same year that
Estep was decided. The Act provided numerous bases for review of administrative deci-
sions, including the "substantial evidence" test, all of them broader than the Estep basis-in-
fact standard. Selective service acts, however, have consistently exempted the Selective
Service System from the Administrative Procedure Act. E.g., Selective Service Act of 1947,
ch. 625, § 13(b), 62 Stat. 604, 623 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 463(b) (1976)); see
United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1971); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d
Cir. 1970).
96. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 458 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
97. 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
98. Id. at 396.
99. Id.
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uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him
prima facie within the statutory exemption, dismissal of the claim
solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary to the
spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice.' 100 Although
the Court did not cite Arbitman v. Woodside,'0 its refusal to endorse
the local board's decisions reflected the reasoning of Arbitman that
such a classification action was an abuse of discretion. 102
The Dickinson decision laid the foundation for a conflict that did
not ripen for fifteen years: the obligation of the courts to limit their
review of local board decisions versus the obligation of the local board
to make clear the reasons for its decision. Justice Jackson dissented in
Dickinson, stating that the practical effect of the Court's decision was to
place upon the local boards a burden to build a record, contrary to
Estep and the spirit of the Act.103 Despite Justice Jackson's expressed
concern, lower courts did not interpret Dickinson as imposing such a
burden on the local boards.
Dickinson exemplified one of the difficulties of the basis-in-fact
test enunciated inEstep: the problem of the silent record.104 Two years
after Dickinson, in Witmer v. United States,10 5 the Court warned that
"it is not for the courts to sit as super draft boards, substituting their
100. Id. at 397. This language and the rationale underlying it are important in part
because the Court made no effort to cast its decision in the familiar vocabulary of lack of
jurisdiction of the local board. Dickinson was not always followed on this point by the lower
courts. See United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968) (suggesting local
board's mere statement of disbelief of registrant's sincerity would suffice to satisfy the Estep
basis-in-fact test). Other courts, however, have stated that "to sustain the denial of a claim
on a mere ipse dixit of lack of sincerity . . . would create serious possibilities of abuse."
United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960); see
also Capobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971); Kess-
ler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1969). Stated more affirmatively, "[i]t seems
quite evident that mere disbelief is not enough, and that there must be some affirmative
evidence to support the rejection of the claimed exemption, or something in the record
which substantially blurs the picture painted by the registrant and casts doubt on his sincer-
ity or the genuineness of his claim." Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233, 237 (8th Cir.
1958).
101. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919).
102. See notes 57-59 & accompanying text supra.
103. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting,
joined by Burton, J. & Minton, J.). The dissent also recognized, but did not attempt to solve,
the problem inherent in its approach. "The board, through silence, makes the registrant's
task of proving lack of jurisdiction next to impossible." Id. at 400.
104. This aspect of the problem arose regularly in basis-in-fact cases, as the courts strug-
gled with the burden of evaluating opaque local board decisions. See, e.g., Rosengart v.
Laird, 449 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 908 (1972); Keefer v. United States, 313
F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1963); Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1958).
105. 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
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judgments on the weight of the evidence for those of the designated
agencies." 106 Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the
Estep basis-in-fact standard, admonishing the lower courts to eschew
any search for substantial evidence. 107
The silent record problem arose because local selective service
boards, as in Dickinson and Witmer, rarely stated reasons for their ac-
tions. In Owens v. United States,108 the Tenth Circuit described the
process used by the courts when faced with a silent record: "[W]here,
as here, the Board discloses no reasons for the challenged classification
. ..we will assume the Board relied upon whatever factual basis is
reflected in the record, if any." 10 9 The Owens court thus suggested that
courts would undertake a broad inquiry in attempting to locate any
basis for upholding a selective service decision, and at the same time
approved the narrow scope of review prescribed by Dickinson.
The technique of review described by the Tenth Circuit, however,
did not resolve the problem, and invited the judiciary to endorse local
board decisions blindly. For example, in United States v. Stetter,l10 the
registrant had presented a prima facie claim for conscientious objector
status, and his file contained no conflicting evidence. The local board
stated no reasons for denying the claim. Reversing the district court's
conviction, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's suggestion that
it search for any basis in fact to support the board's decision.
If the objective facts found in the record do not lead us to the factual
basis, as they do not, the Government asserts that we may assume
that intangible factors such a [sic] demeanor form such a basis. But
how can we as a reviewing court know that the Board relied on such
submicroscopic data if we are not so informed? We are not endowed
with extrasensory perception. It is like playing the philosopher's
Came of looking into a dark room for a black cat that is not there.
erefuse to play such a game.11
106. Id. at 380-81. This theme would be repeated by lower courts. See, e.g., Kessler v.
United States, 406 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir. 1969); Riles v. United States, 223 F.2d 786, 788
(5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Ruppell, 278 F. Supp. 287, 289-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
107. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. at 381 (citing Dickinson v. United States, 346
U.S. 389, 396 (1953)).
Although the local board had remained silent about its reasons for denying the claim,
the Witmer Court found in the file enough conflicting evidence to conclude that the local
board had had a basis in fact for doubting the registrant's sincerity. 348 U.S. at 382-83.
108. 396 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968).
109. Id. at 542-43.
110. 445 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971).
111. Id. at 482. As a practical matter, the government's argument would require that all
Selective Service defendants be convicted except when the local board failed to follow re-
quired procedures or affirmatively stated illegal reasons for its decisions. Silence would then
become the best procedure for any local board, and judicial review would, as one court put
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Thus, as in Dickinson, the Stetter court refused to assume an unstated
basis for the board's decision and refused to permit a local board to
reject a claim without evidence of its insufficiency. 112
The Problem of Erroneous Bases for Decisions
Local boards sometimes did state reasons for their decisions. Oc-
casionally, reasons deficient in law or fact were commingled with valid
reasons for the local board's decision. The first case of this type to
reach the Supreme Court was Sicurella v. United States,1 3 decided in
1955, in which Sicurella, a Jehovah's Witness, had been refused classifi-
cation as a conscientious objector. In his application, he declared him-
self a soldier "in the Army of Christ.""' 4 The defendant's claim had
been investigated by the Department of Justice,1 5 which recommended
denial of the deferment on the ground that Sicurella was not, as re-
quired by the statute, "opposed to participation in war in any form."'" 6
The appeal board denied the claim, and upon Sicurella's refusal to sub-
mit to induction, he was indicted and convicted.
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that the
Department of Justice erred when it stated that Sicurella's willingness
to participate in a theocratic war disqualified him under the statute." 7
The Court noted the possibility that the record contained some proper
it, "be a meaningless exercise." Barker v. Laird, No. 1276-70, slip op. at 12 (D.N.J. Jan. 8,
1971).
112. The Stetter court ruled that local boards and appeal boards would be required to
state reasons for rejecting prima facie claims for conscientious objector status. 445 F.2d at
483. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text bfra.
113. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
114. Id. at 386.
115. Under the Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (1976)), claims for conscientious objector status were, after
decision by the local board, referred by the appeal board to the Department of Justice for
investigation and hearing. The Department would then make a recommendation to the ap-
peal board to assist that board's decision. This provision was deleted from § 60) in 1967.
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100, 104.
116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4566) (1976). This statutory language consistently was interpreted
by the courts to preclude selective conscientious objection, that is, opposition to particular
wars but not to all. See, eg., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
117. The Court found the error of law arising in the Selective Service System's misinter-
pretation of congressional intent in enacting the conscientious objector exemption.
"[A]Ithough the Jehovah's Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not able to
stretch our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick of the Congress includes
within its measure such spiritual wars between the powers of good and evil where the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, if they participate, will do so without carnal weapons. We believe that
Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it referred to participation in war in any
form-actual military conflicts between nations of the earth in our time-wars with bombs
and bullets, tanks, planes and rockets. We believe the reasoning of the Government in de-
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basis in fact to support the decision, but held that "where it is impossi-
ble to determine on exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided,
the integrity of the Selective Service System demands, at least that the
Government not recommend illegal grounds." 118 Thus, the Court in-
corporated into selective service law a principle long recognized in
criminal law: a conviction based upon some valid and some invalid
grounds cannot be allowed to stand. 119
Many cases following Sicurella also espoused this principle, 120
with the result that the application of the basis-in-fact test changed.
Sicurella restricted the court's role in reviewing classification actions.
If reasons were stated by the board, the reviewing court could no longer
search the record for a basis in fact, as in Dickinson v. United States,12 1
but was instead limited to that part of the record relied upon by the
board. The review was more critical of local board actions, however,
because it was more difficult for local boards to state correct reasons
than to remain silent and permit the court to find some supporting
rationale. 22
Thus, although basis in fact remained the test of validity of local
board classification decisions, its significance changed after Sicurella.
nying petitioner's claim is so far removed from any possible congressional intent that it is
erroneous as a matter of law." 348 U.S. at 391.
118. Id. at 392.
119. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which a general jury
verdict of guilty followed instructions that there were three possible grounds to support con-
viction. One of the bases tendered by the trial court to the jury was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court overturned the conviction. "[Ihf any of the clauses in question is invalid
under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld." Id. at 368.
Deciding Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971), the Supreme Court traced applica-
tion of the principle in selective service law to the decision in United States ex rel. Levy v.
Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945), and noted also its appearance in Ypparila v. United
States, 219 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1954). See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. at 705. Sicurella,
however, marks the beginning of the principle's general acceptance in this area of law.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Callison, 433 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.), vacated, 399 U.S. 526
(1970); United States v. French, 429 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Purvis, 403
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). The court in
Owens v. United States, 396 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968), observed:
"If the Board states reasons for its action . . . and these reasons are found to be legally
insufficient to support the Board's classification, the classification should be found to be
without a basis in fact. This is true even if an independent search of the record discloses an
adequate basis in fact to support the action of the Board, for there would be the risk that the
impropriety of the stated reasons tainted the Board's decision." Id. at 542-43.
121. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
122. This anomaly was suggested by the court in Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705,
716 (2d Cir. 1968): "[The] decision was not grounded in considerations of military need and
the question before us is the validity of the decision actually rendered, not of a decision that
might have been on other facts."
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The Sicurella rule compelled a finding of no basis in fact whenever the
record included erroneous reasons for the board's decision, although
other and proper bases might exist in the record. The basis-in-fact test
had evolved to require that the record contain at least no improper
bases.
Use of the Sicurella rule also suggested another problem with ap-
plying only the basis-in-fact test: application of the test could allow a
court to affirm board decisions based on unstated illegal grounds. If
due process was offended by the endorsement of selective service deci-
sions based upon illegal grounds stated by the local board,123 it would
also be offended by the endorsement of decisions founded upon illegal
grounds that remained unstated. Awareness of this anomaly caused
the courts,124 and then Congress, 25 to require the Selective Service Sys-
tem to give reasons for its classification actions.
The Age of Reasons
As the war in Viet Nam escalated, with corresponding increases in
draft calls, 126 dissatisfaction with the Selective Service System's opera-
tions grew. 127 In part, the rising tide of selective service prosecutions
may have helped focus the courts' attention on the problems engen-
dered by the basis-in-fact test.' 28 Beginning in 1969, a series of cases
was decided that substantially altered this test by requiring local boards
to state reasons for their classification decisions.
The first of these, a Ninth Circuit decision, focused on the diffi-
123. See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). See note 119 & accompanying text
supra.
124. See notes 129-44 & accompanying text infra.
125. See notes 159-61 & accompanying text infra.
126. See, e.g., 302,000 Men Face Draft During 1968, a 72,000 Increase, N.Y. Times, Jan.
20, 1968, at 3, col. 6.
127. One judge, concluding a case in which he found that the local board had acted
arbitrarily, reflected the public's deteriorating confidence in the System. "The draft board's
overzealous, highhanded and erroneous handling of this young man's plight hardly inspires
confidence in the system.... At the very least, those entrusted with the awful power of
conscripting the nation's young men into the armed forces in time of war or other military
venture owe a duty of the most searching examination of the facts, scrupulous fairness, sen-
sitive care, compassionate hearing, patient consideration, cautious action and deliberate and
rational decision within the law. We afford no less to the worst criminal in our society."
Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
128. In fiscal 1965, the year of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat.
384 (1964), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971), there were 341
Selective Service prosecutions. By 1968, there were 1,192, followed in 1970 by 2,833 and in
1972 by 4,906. [July-December 1972] SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 46.
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culty presented by records without reasons. In United States v.
Haughton, 29 the registrant's claim of conscientious objector status was
denied. On appeal following his conviction for refusal to submit to
induction, the court rejected Haughton's argument that Dickinson v.
United States130 required the local board to build a record supporting
its denial. 13' Nevertheless, the court refused to endorse denial of a
prima facie claim absent a statement of reasons. Without such reasons,
"a court cannot determine whether a board's denial of a requested clas-
sification was based on a belief that the registrant's statements, even if
true, did not entitle him to the classification, or on the reasonable dis-
belief of certain allegations necessary to the registrant's prima facie
case." 32 The Ninth Circuit thus brought into focus the key area of
conflict between the Estep basis-in-fact test and the Sicurella line of
cases. Particularly in conscientious objector cases, in which the critical
issue frequently was the registrant's sincerity in making the claim, 133
the courts were unwilling to infer from a silent record that the local
board had properly evaluated an application and rejected it for legiti-
mate reasons. Thus, the Dickinson approach of searching the record to
locate a legitimate reason for the local board's decision, thereby satisfy-
ing the basis-in-fact test, was abandoned. The courts had become
aware of the test's substantial problems.' 34
129. 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969).
130. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). See notes 97-103 & accompanying text supra.
131. 413 F.2d at 738.
132. Id. at 739 (citing United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), ajf'dsub
nom. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)). The Ninth Circuit had rejected this rule
in Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
Haughton implicitly overruled Parrott.
133. See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1955) (upholding denial of
conscientious objector status based on examination of facts before the board).
134. In another sense, the Dickinson approach temporarily remained intact. If a regis-
trant's prima facie claim for conscientious objector status was denied by a local board be-
cause it perceived the registrant as being insincere, a search of the record would reveal no
basis in fact absent a statement from the local board. The Sixth Circuit had recognized this
in United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968). Washington recognized a dis-
tinction between Dickinson and the typical conscientious objector case in that Dickinson's
claim was for a ministerial exemption, "the validity of which depended on proof of certain
objective facts with regard to the registrant's religious activities." Id. at 39. Conscientious
objector cases, by contrast, involve an entirely subjective component: whether the local
board believes the registrant is sincere. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381-82
(1955). The Washington court thus distinguished Dickinson: "Hence, in cases where the
claimed classification depends on objective facts, mere disbelief by the selective service au-
thorities will not provide a basis in fact for granting a different classification. Where, how-
ever, the veracity of the registrant is the principal issue, disbelief will suffice. But even in the
latter situation, the record must contain some statement of this disbelief if the classification
is to be upheld upon judicial review." United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d at 39. There-
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Other circuits also confronted the problems raised by a denial of
conscientious objector claims. In United States v. James,135 the Fourth
Circuit attempted both to remain faithful to Estep's command that ju-
dicial review be narrowly circumscribed and, following Sicurella, to re-
quire that no unlawful reasons for the board's decision appear in the
record. It held, therefore, that if a draft board rejected a conscientious
objector claim because the board did not believe the registrant, that
disbelief must be stated in the record.' 36 The court explained its
concern:
[W]e would be reluctant to sanction a decision of a local board when,
from the record, we can only speculate that there may have been a
basis in fact for the decision.... Where the local board's conclu-
sion may be explainable upon alternate grounds, both legally accept-
able and unacceptable, the risk is too great that we would place an
imprimatur upon an insupportable basis of decision if we were to
accept the government's contention.137
Thus, the James court implicitly established a requirement that the lo-
cal board state reasons for its disbelief.'38
The Fourth Circuit reconsidered the issues raised in James only a
year later in United States v. Broyles,139 which also concerned a prima
facie conscientious objector claim denied without a statement of rea-
sons. 40 Noting James's requirement that the local board state its find-
ing of insincerity,14' the court expanded that principle to require a
statement of reasons in all conscientious objector cases:
In any case where the board fails to disclose the basis for its decision,
we risk blind endorsement of a mistake of law. Where it is clear that
aprimafacie case was established, we conclude that in conscientious
objector cases, it is essential to the validity of an order to report [for
induction] that the board state its basis of decision and the reasons
therefor, i.e., whether it has found the registrant incredible, or insin-
cere, or of bad faith, and why.' 42
fore, Dickinson's search-the-record approach would continue to be used, as long as the local
board stated its disbelief.
135. 417 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). The facts of James are, in relevant part, identical to
those in Haughton. The registrant's conscientious objector claim was denied by the Selective
Service System. No reasons for the denial were stated at any level. James refused induction
and was convicted.
136. Id. at 831; accord United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968).
137. 417 F.2d at 831-32 (emphasis in original).
138. "[lIt is not sufficient that the board merely state its disbelief in a registrant's sincer-
ity, .. T.. Ihere must be a 'rational basis' for the refusal of the Board to accept the validity
of a registrant's religious claims." Id. at 832 (emphasis in original).
139. 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1300-02.
141. Id. at 1303.
142. Id. at 1304. In reaching its decision, the court reviewed briefly an effort made dur-
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After Broyles, therefore, the Fourth Circuit required the Selective Serv-
ice System to state its reasons for denying any prima facie conscien-
tious objector claim.' 43
The decisions in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits quickly found sup-
port in other circuits.' 44 Recognizing that they could not properly re-
view conscientious objector cases, in which there was a substantial
subjective element, 145 without knowing why the local board had acted,
the courts declined to undertake the search of the record commended
to them in Dickinson. Their insistence that local boards present reasons
broadened the originally narrow scope of judicial review articulated in
Estep. By insisting that local boards explain their actions, however, the
courts did attempt to follow Witmer v. United States,146 in which the
Supreme Court warned against reviewing courts acting as super draft
boards. 47 Therefore, it is at least arguable that the evolution of the
ing the 1967 revision of the selective service laws to require local boards to state reasons in
conscientious objector cases. The court noted that the effort failed, but declined to find in
Congress' refusal an intent that there be no reasons stated. The majority suggested that
Congress might have presumed reasons to be necessary so that judicial review procedures
were not "empty gestures." Id. at 1306. Broyles is, however, the only case to suggest this
view of Congress' failure to act. Moreover, Congress' subsequent adoption of 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 471a(b)(4) (1976), see notes 159-61 & accompanying text infra, suggests that it made no
such presumption.
143. Dissenting in Broyles, Judge Bryan argued that reasons should not be required and
should not be considered in the court's review. Instead, he contended that Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), compelled the conclusion that a reviewing court was required to
search the entire record for a basis in fact. United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d at 1310
(Bryan, J., dissenting). The holding of the majority, he feared, would cast too great a burden
upon local boards and would interfere with the efficient functioning of the Selective Service
System. Id. at 1310-11. Judge Bryan failed to explain, however, how the reviewing court
could both search the record and also remain faithful to Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S.
385 (1955), in any case in which reasons were stated. See notes 113-22 & accompanying text
supra. Judge Bryan had also dissented in United States v. James, 417 F.2d 826, 832 (4th Cir.
1969).
144. See, e.g., McAliley v. Birdsong, 451 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49 (Ist Cir. 1971);
United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d
472 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Lenhard, 437 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir.
1970); United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1970); Caverly v. United States, 429
F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Abbott, 425 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1970); Capobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970),
vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971).
145. Compare Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) (upholding denial of consci-
entious objector status when record showed registrant's inconsistent statements) with Dickin-
son v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953) (reversing denial of status when refusal of
legitimately claimed exemption was based on mere suspicion and speculation).
146. 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
147. Id. at 380-81. See notes 105-06 & accompanying text supra.
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statement-of-reasons rule in conscientious objector cases reflects con-
tinued adherence by the courts to their limited scope of review.1 48 It is
difficult to see how the Sicurella rule could be observed and applied by
reviewing courts confronted by silent records.
The early cases concerning statements of reasons all addressed
conscientious objector claims.149 No logical reason, however, required
the statement-of-reasons rule to be limited to this type of deferment.
The statement of reasons that the courts required to facilitate judicial
review150 would assist evaluation of any challenged classification
decision.
The first case to consider the possibility of expanding the rule was
United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird,151 in which the registrant had
presented a compelling argument for a hardship deferment.1 52 After
the initial rejection of his classification, Bent wrote to the local board,
requesting its reasons for rejecting his claim. 53 The board stated no
reasons, but forwarded his file to the appeal board, which silently af-
firmed the denial of the claim. Bent subsequently was inducted and
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.' 54 The court, reflecting the ear-
lier cases' difficulty in dealing with opaque records, recited some of the
possible underpinnings of the local board's decision, which, had they
been stated, would have invalidated the induction order.155 The Third
Circuit recognized that "[vIery possibly the reasons for that decision
were entirely proper and would be sustained if we knew them."'156 On
148. See United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 1971).
149. See cases cited in note 144 supra.
150. See, e.g., Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132, 1137 (3d Cir. 1970).
151. 453 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1971).
152. Id. at 632. Registrants who could demonstrate extreme hardship to dependents in
the event of induction were entitled to be deferred in class 3-A. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(h)
(1976); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30 (1970).
153. 453 F.2d at 628-29.
154. Id. at 629-30. The case was more complicated procedurally. Bent was ordered for
induction, but refused to submit. He was indicted, but thereafter agreed to submit to induc-
tion in exchange for the government's nolleprosequi of the indictment. Upon his induction,
the indictment was withdrawn, and Bent challenged the local board's classification action by
habeas corpus. Id. at 630.
In the district court, the government argued that Bent was estopped to bring the writ
because of his agreement to submit to induction. Although the district court concurred,
denying the petition, id. at 626-27, the court of appeals did not. "The only thing the United
States Attorney asked in exchange for disposing of the criminal matter was that Bent now
comply with the order to submit to induction. He was not asked and did not agree to give
up the right to seek judicial review of his classification by post induction habeas corpus."
Id. at 630. Thus, the court allowed consideration of Bent's claim on the merits.
155. Id. at 632.
156. Id.
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the record presented on review, however, the court reversed the denial
of the claim, extending the statement-of-reasons rule beyond conscien-
tious objector cases. 157 Thus, the court explicitly extended the state-
ment-of-reasons rule to cases in which the registrant was astute enough
to request them 58 and implicitly extended the rule to all other defer-
ment requests.
The Bent court based its decision in part upon Congress' 1971
amendments of the Military Selective Service Act. 159 After much de-
bate, Congress added to the statute a section on procedural rights, 60
one of which was what Bent had requested of the court: "In the event
of a decision adverse to the claims of the registrant, the local or appeal
board making such decision shall, upon request, furnish to such regis-
trant a brief written statement of the reasons for its decision."' 6' Al-
though the statute was enacted too late to control the decision in Bent,
its passage assured the Third Circuit that expanding its rule requiring
statements of reasons would not be seen as an undue burden on the
Selective Service System. 162
157. "Because a statement of reasons is as essential for meaningful administrative and
judicial review of the rejection of a hardship claim as for the rejection of a conscientious
objector claim, because that requirement is no more onerous with respect to a hardship
claim than with respect to a conscientious objector claim, and because Congress has con-
curred in the judgment of many courts that a statement of reasons is an appropriate proce-
dural right, we hold that at least in cases where after a hardship claim is rejected the
registrant has requested reasons, the failure to furnish some statement of reasons invalidates
the order to report for induction." Id. at 634.
In Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit had
adopted the statement-of-reasons rule for conscientious objector cases.
158. 453 F.2d at 634.
159. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, 85 Stat. 348 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 451-473 (1976)).
160. 50 U.S.C. app. § 471a (1976).
161. Id. § 471a(b)(4). This provision was the subject of considerable congressional de-
bate. Those favoring the provision had originally proposed a version that would have re-
quired reasons to be furnished whether or not the registrant asked for them. Their
arguments reflected an awareness of the courts' views, see notes 170-71 & accompanying text
infra, that neither an effective administrative appeal nor significant judicial review could be
had without a statement of reasons. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 20,505 (1971) (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy). This version failed to pass, however, and was replaced by § 471a(b)(4),
requiring registrants to ask for a statement of reasons if they wanted one. Speaking in sup-
port of that section, Senator Kennedy remarked that "the Selective Service System as it
exists today denies fundamental rights of due process, rights traditionally protected by both
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution." 117 CONG. REC. 21,954 (1971).
Those opposed to the provision argued that it would make the Selective Service process
too adversarial and would impede the System's functioning. See, e.g., id. at 21,955 (remarks
of Sen. Ervin). Whether either of these reasons should be regarded as sufficient is discussed
at notes 195-96 & accompanying text infra.
162. See 453 F.2d at 633.
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Thus, twenty-five years after AEstep, the scope of judicial review of
selective service classifications seemed to be defined. The principles of
fairness underlying Sicurella v. United States, 163 United States v.
James,164 and United States ex rel Bent v. Laird165 appeared to have
weighed more heavily than the more ephemeral considerations of non-
interference with the Selective Service System and the military reflected
in Falbo v. United States,166 Estep v. United States,167 and Dickinson v.
United States.'68 The emergence of the statement-of-reasons rule was
the necessary product of the synthesis of the Estep and Sicurella doc-
trines, because the courts could not know whether a local board had a
proper basis in fact for its decision when the basis was not stated. Yet
the resolution of the conflict begun in Dickinson 169 is based only upon
practical considerations of facilitating administrative 70 and judicial re-
view. 17 1 Moreover, because Congress enacted the statement-of-reasons
rule, 172 the rule is subject to repeal by subsequent legislation. Finally,
the benefit of the statute is limited to registrants sophisticated enough
to invoke it by requesting a statement of reasons. A more enduring
foundation for this rule thus is necessary.
Due Process Review of Classification Decisions
The cases that created the statement-of-reasons rule as an adjunct
to the basis-in-fact test did not clearly set forth the rule's justification.
Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Haughton,173
noted that registrants claiming conscientious objector status articulated
their claims in different ways and required statements of reasons to fa-
cilitate proper judicial review. 174 Other courts stated that the rule was
163. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
164. 417 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969).
165. 453 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1971).
166. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
167. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
168. 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
169. See text accompanying notes 97-103 supra.
170. See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955); United States v.
Edwards, 450 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971).
171. See United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird, 453 F.2d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Deere, 428 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th
Cir. 1969).
172. 50 U.S.C. app. § 471a(b)(4) (1976).
173. 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969).
174. Id. at 742; accord Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. An-
drews, 446 F.2d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472, 482-83
(5th Cir. 1971); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132, 1137 (3d Cir. 1970).
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necessary to ensure meaningful appellate review within the administra-
tive process of the Selective Service System. 175 Other courts did not
address the question. 176
The court in United States v. Abbott 177 gave a different explana-
tion: "Fundamental due process requires that the defendant be entitled
to either know or be able to infer from the file itself the basis for the
rejection of a conscientious objector claim."' 178 Abbott is thus the only
appellate decision to base the statement-of-reasons rule directly upon
due process of law. 179 The only other appellate opinion directly to re-
fer to the due process clause in the context of the statement-of-reasons
rule is Justice Douglas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Windsor
175. United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher,
439 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955): "Just as the
right to a hearing means the right to a meaningful hearing,. . . so the right to file a state-
ment before the Appeal Board includes the right to file a meaningful statement, one based
on all the facts in the file and made with awareness of the recommendations and arguments
to be countered." In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) and Simmons v. United
States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955), the Supreme Court required that registrants be provided with a
resume of the F.B.I. reports given by the Department of Justice to the selective service ap-
peal boards after investigation of conscientious objector claims. Otherwise, the Court rea-
soned, registrants could not get fair appeals within the Selective Service System's
administrative process. Although those cases are no longer directly applicable because the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 abolished Department of Justice investigations, see
note 115 supra, the principle underlying the decisions, that knowledge of the basis of a local
board's action is essential to fair appellate review, remains.
The court in United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971), explained how a
statement of reasons might help the Selective Service System avoid error: "[S]ince the Ap-
peal Boards are not restricted to the scope of review delineated in [Estep] but may reclassify,
they might well reject a given basis for Local Board action which a reviewing court would
feel constrained to accept. An Appeal Board might know, for example, that a given Local
Board, when compared with other Local Boards under its jurisdiction, consistently finds
conscientious objector claimants to be insincere on very little evidence. It might scrutinize
the basis for decision from that Local Board more carefully than otherwise. It cannot do so
when the basis for the Local Board action is unknown." Id. at 108.
176. See, e.g., Caverly v. United States, 429 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970); Capobianco v.
Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971).
177. 425 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1970).
178. Id. at 913 n.4; see also United States ex rel. Morton v. McBee, 310 F. Supp. 328
(N.D. Ill. 1970); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The due
process rationale of these cases, however, has not been explicitly followed, either at the ap-
pellate or trial levels.
179. In one of the leading statement-of-reasons cases, Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431
F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970), Judge Aldisert explicitly stated that the rule was not constitution-
ally based. Id. at 1138 (Aldisert, J., concurring). The court in United States v. Stetter, 445
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 110-12 & accompanying text supra, referred to
fairness, but did not otherwise use the language of due process.
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v. United States. °80 The Fifth Circuit had applied the statement-of-
reasons rule, but found the reasons stated by the local board to be suffi-
cient. Justice Douglas declared: "A statement of reasons accompany-
ing a decision adverse to the applicant is no less a requirement of due
process [than a hearing on a conscientious objector claim]."'' 1
The Selective Service System should be required to state reasons
for all classification decisions to ensure that no one is compelled to
serve when denials of deferment requests have no lawful basis. As the
courts recognized in developing the statement-of-reasons rule, without
such a statement it is impossible for the courts to review properly the
decisions of local draft boards. 8 2 The courts often found that a local
board's stated reasons were erroneous as a matter of law, vitiating the
induction order under the principle of Sicurella v. United States.183
There also may have been cases in which the local board relied in part
on erroneous reasons, but did not in fact state any reasons. If a state-
ment-of-reasons rule is in effect, the illegal induction orders that are the
product of such tainted reasoning can be identified, and the registrants
reprocessed lawfully. Without the rule, and without such a statement,
the courts reviewing such cases will search the record for evidence sup-
porting the local board's decision, as commanded by Estep and Dickin-
son.184 They will not search for possible erroneous bases for decision.
In a case in which a silent local board has several reasons, some valid
and some invalid, the decision will be affirmed. The only difference
between this case and a case under the Sicurella principle, however, is
the election of the local board to set forth its reasons; a registrant's
liberty should not depend on a matter of so little substance.
180. 419 U.S. 938 (1974) (Douglas, I., dissenting), denying cert. to, 488 F.2d 1364 (5th
Cir. 1973).
181. Id. at 939. Justice Douglas went on to explain why he felt the statement of reasons
rule was essential for the proper functioning of the basis-in-fact test. "It is a 'simple but
fundamental rule of administrative law... [that if] the administrative action is to be tested
by the basis on which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be
understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying
the agency's action."' Id. at 940-41 (quoting S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97
(1947)). Thus, although the Selective Service System had been treated as a special case in
the field of administrative law, see note 95 supra, Justice Douglas recognized the constitu-
tional necessity of the rule.
182. For example, in McAliley v. Birdsong, 451 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1971), the court
explicitly observed that without a statement of reasons, the courts could not perform the
review mandated by Estep. Id. at 1248. This observation raises the constitutional problem,
recognized by Justice Murphy in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125-28 (1946) (Mur-
phy, J., concurring), inherent in entering criminal convictions essentially without judicial
supervision. See notes 78-125 & accompanying text supra.
183. 348 U.S. 385 (1955). See notes 113-25 & accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 88-103 & accompanying text supra.
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The Military Selective Service Act requires decisionmakers in the
Selective Service System to state reasons for decisions adverse to regis-
trants only if requested to do so. 185 Two problems are raised by this
limitation. First, as a policy matter, due process ought to be available
as a matter of course, not limited to situations in which it is requested.
Second, registrants should not be assumed to know that they must as-
sert their rights.1 86 The probable effect of providing reasons only upon
request is to place a less sophisticated registrant at a disadvantage.1 8 7
Vulnerability to induction or to criminal penalties for refusing to sub-
mit to induction should depend upon entitlement to deferment or ex-
emption or the lack of such entitlement, and not upon an uncounseled
registrant's legal sophistication.
Moreover, that due process may require decisionmakers to state
reasons has been recognized explicitly in many other areas of law. For
example, in Kent v. United States, 8 8 the defendant had been arrested in
the District of Columbia and charged as a juvenile with housebreaking,
robbery, and rape. The juvenile court waived its otherwise exclusive
jurisdiction, permitting Kent to be tried and sentenced as an adult in a
district court. The judge recited no reason for this waiver, but declared
that it had been made after full investigation.18 9 The Supreme Court
reversed Kent's conviction and remanded the case for reconsideration
of whether the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction had been proper.
The Court denounced the absence of an explanation for the waiver, 90
leaving no doubt about why it regards a statement of reasons as
essential:
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review.
It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a
statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a
statement of the relevant facts. It may not "assume" that there are
adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that "full investigation"
has been made.' 91
185. 50 U.S.C. § 471a(b)(4) (1976). See note 161 & accompanying text supra.
186. The courts have recognized registrants' limitations in this respect. E.g., United
States v. Stephens, 445 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215,
218 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Marshall, 340 F. Supp. 117, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
187. See 117 CONG. REc. 20,505 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
188. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
189. Id. at 546.
190. "[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554.
191. Id. at 561. Similarly, the Court has required statements of reasons to support ter-
mination of welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970), revocations of
[Vol. 33
SELECTIVE SERVICE
Another area in which the courts have recognized the dangers of
unsubstantiated decisions is the setting of bail. In United States ex rel
Keating v. Bensinger,192 the defendant used a writ of habeas corpus to
challenge a state court's denial of bail while the appeal was pending.
The court described the inadequacy of a record without a statement of
reasons.
Absent any findings in support of the denial of bond, it is impossible
to ascertain whether or not such denial was arbitrary or discrimina-
tory .... [If reasons are not required,] the guaranty of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments against arbitrariness by a state court in
the setting of bail authorized by the state legislature could be reduced
to a nullity by the mere silence of the court denying bail. If a court
may deny bail with no reason, hardly any set of circumstances can be
imagined wherein it could be determined by a reviewing court that
the denial was arbitrary or discriminatory. 193
The logic of Kent and Bensinger has often been applied to require
a statement of reasons in noncriminal contexts, 194 and such logic is dif-
ficult to refute in selective service cases. The basis-in-fact standard
cannot avoid arbitrary or irrational classification decisions if the courts
are not told what constitutes the basis in fact. Just as in Bensinger, the
basis-in-fact standard is repealed de facto if draft board decisions can
be upheld even when no basis is stated.
Conclusion
Judicial review of draft board decisions has undergone substantial
change since the First World War. At first, courts inquired only into
the local board's jurisdiction; most recently, the courts asked whether
the Selective Service System acted properly in ordering induction. The
changes have been salutary. Judicial review must be sufficiently broad
to ensure that due process is not a hollow concept. The records being
reviewed must be sufficiently clear that the reviewing courts cannot be
parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,487 (1972), and revocations of probation, Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973). As in Kent, the underlying rationale for requiring a
statement of reasons in these situations is that review is impossible when the reviewing body
is not informed of the basis of the decision under review. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 271 (1970).
192. 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. M. 1971)..
193. Id. at 787; see also Maldonado v. Delgado, 345 F. Supp. 993, 995 (D.P.R. 1972).
194. See, ag., Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (denial of eligibility for public housing); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F.
Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (disciplinary prison transfer); White v. Gillman, 360 F.
Supp. 64 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (same); Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(mental patient's transfer to ward for the criminally insane); United States v. McNeil, 434
F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (denial of release from hospital for mental patients).
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accused of blindly endorsing decisions made on silent records. At least,
due process should require that the Selective Service System supply
reasons supported by evidence to justify any decision curtailing liberty.
Inchoate fears that the process will become too adversarial and that the
Selective Service System will be disrupted should not be used to excuse
a denial of due process. A process that deprives an individual of liberty
is inherently adversarial, and there is no evidence that the Selective
Service System will be unable to perform its function if required to
operate within the bounds of the Constitution. In this area, as in
others, the appearance of fairness is as important as the fact. The ap-
pearance cannot be maintained or the fact ensured if the courts are
forced by too narrow a scope of review to endorse decisions that may
be based upon ignorance, misapprehension of the law, or bias. Only a
process that allows judicial examination can avoid these traps.
Due process at least should entitle registrants who have unsuccess-
fully claimed deferment or exemption to know why their lives are being
put at risk and their liberty circumscribed. 195
The absence of reasons for governmental action has a long his-
tory of abuse. The King of England used to withhold from the courts
the reasons for detaining prisoners who sought release by habeas
corpus. In Darnels Case, decided in 1627, the absence of a reason for
detention was held to justify the detention. "Mr. Attorney hath told
you that the King hath done it, and we trust him in great matters,
and he is bound by law, and he bids us proceed by law, as we are
sworn to do, and so is the king; and we make no doubt but the king,
if you seek to him, he knowing the cause why you are imprisoned, he
will have mercy." 196
The return of the draft will reopen the issue of whether the Selective
Service System must justify its classification decisions. No individual
should be compelled to serve in the military after rejection of a claim
for exemption or deferment if the government cannot or does not ex-
plain the reason for the decision.
195. As Senator Javits stated: "The draftee [should know] why he will have to accept
the fate which is his." 117 CONG. REC. 21,956 (1971).
196. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 59 (1980) (quoting Darnel's Case, 3 St. Tr. 2 (K.
B. 1627)).
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